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JURY DISCRIMINATION-Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct.
1712 (1986).
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
that the purposeful exclusion of blacks from jury service is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment.' Nevertheless, prosecutors consist-
ently use unfettered peremptory challenges to remove pro-
spective black jurors from the petit juries of black defendants.2
Batson v. Kentucky,3 illustrates a recent effort by the
Supreme Court to reach a compromise between these conflict-
ing interests. By virtue of this decision, a defendant is able to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination in selection of a
jury relying solely on the facts in his or her case.4 Once such a
showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a
neutral explanation for his challenges.5 Thus, discriminatory
acts resulting from the unchecked use of peremptory chal-
lenges are no longer protected within a single case,6 and the
promise of equal protection to all is enhanced.7
After a brief statement of the case, this Note will offer a
historical perspective of this area of the law and discuss the
various opinions of the Batson Court. The Note will conclude
1. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See infra notes 22-23.
2. A peremptory challenge is a statutory right to dismiss any party from jury ser-
vice without having to give a reason for the elimination. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 220 (1965). Traditionally, courts have given great deference to the unrestricted use
of these challenges:
American courts and legislatures first confronted the issue of representative ju-
ries following the Civil War. In succeeding years, racial prejudice was attacked
at each step in the jury selection process, but the final step, the exercise of per-
emptory challenges, has been traditionally unassailable. Counsel for both plain-
tiff and defendant were, and still are privileged to strike an alotted number of
veniremen from a final panel without explanation. Prosecutorial exercise of the
government's peremptory challenges against non-white potential jurors often re-
sults in the empanelment of an all-white jury to determine the guilt or innocence
of black and other racial minority criminal defendants.
Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite
Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554, 554 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
3. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
4. Id. at 1722.
5. Id. at 1723.
6. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
7. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722.
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with a critique comparing the decision's strengths with its pre-
dominant weakness.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
James Kirkland Batson was brought to trial on charges of
second-degree burglary8 and receipt of stolen goods.9 After
the court excused certain jurors for cause, the prosecutor used
his peremptory challenges 0 to strike all four black venire-
men. I1  As a result, an all-white jury was selected to try the
black defendant. The defense counsel moved to discharge the
jury, contending that the prosecutor's purposeful exclusion of
blacks constituted a denial of Batson's sixth amendment right
to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community 12 and
8. 19- Ky. REV. STAT. & R. SERV. § 513.030 (Baldwin).
9. Id. at § 514.110.
10. The peremptory challenge is used in every state. It is regarded as an essential
tool in finding an impartial jury because it permits parties to remove anyone suspected
of being biased without assigning a specific cause. In most jurisdictions, the number of
peremptory challenges allotted varies with the offense. Some jurisdictions allow the
prosecution and the defense the same number of challenges, while many others give
more challenges to the defense. See generally A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
855-62 (1930).
11. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1715 (1986). The Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide:
After jurors have been excused for cause, the parties exercise their peremptory
challenges simultaneously by striking names from a list of qualified jurors equal
to the number to be seated plus the number of allowable peremptory challenges.
Rule 9.36. Since the offense charged in this case was a felony, and an alternate
juror was called, the prosecutor was entitled to six peremptory challenges, and
defense counsel to nine. Rule 9.40.
Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715 n.2.
12. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715. The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides
in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Courts have inter-
preted this to mean that "criminal defendants are entitled, as a matter of due process, to
a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community. This is an essential
element of a fair and impartial jury." Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 378 (1972).
There is a split of authority as to whether peremptory challenges used to strike black
jurors in any particular case are a denial of the cross section requirement. Cases assert-
ing that striking black jurors is a violation of the sixth amendment include: Booker v.
Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 910 (1987); McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3289 (1987). The opposite
view is illustrated in United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983) (en bane),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
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his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the
laws. 13 The motion was denied. ' 4
Batson was tried and convicted on both criminal counts.'5
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, 16 the constitu-
tionality of the prosecutor's conduct was again challenged
without success. 17 Following the precedent of Swain v. Ala-
bama, 8 the court held that a defendant who alleges lack of a
fair cross section must establish a pattern of discriminatory
challenges over a period of time. 19 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, however, ruling that a defendant
may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimi-
13. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715. Equal protection of the laws ensures that ".equal
protection and security shall be given to all under like circumstances in his life, his
liberty, and his property, and in the pursuit of happiness, and in the exemption from
any greater burdens and charges than are equally imposed upon all others under like
circumstances." Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Casodos, 21 F. Supp. 989, 994 (D.C.N.M.
1938).
14. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715. Jury selection is a three-step process. First, a list of
prospective jurors is compiled. Next, those on the list who meet certain statutory re-
quirements are excused from jury duty leaving the venire. The third step, known as voir
dire, gives both the prosecution and the defense an opportunity to question the
veniremembers in an effort to uncover any biases. Challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges are then exercised resulting in the formation of the petit jury. For an over-
view of this process, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCER-
TAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 85-177 (1977). In Batson, the judge
denied the petitioner's motion to discharge the jury, opining that the selection of the
venire is subject to the cross section requirement but the selection of the petit jury is not.
Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715. See infra note 26.
15. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715.
16. Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 (D. Ky. June 25, 1985) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file).
17. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715. The petitioner argued on two grounds. First, he
cited caselaw holding that discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a single case
is a violation of the sixth amendment. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d
748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d
499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). Second, the petitioner argued that the facts
showed that the prosecutor had engaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges
within the case and thus had established an equal protection claim under Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
18. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
19. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1716. Swain held that it would not be enough to prove
that all prospective black jurors had been removed by the prosecutor in the defendant's
trial. Instead, systematic exclusion of an identifiable group of jurors from the venire is
necessary to establish a violation of the equal protection clause. 380 U.S. at 220-23.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently reaffirmed this position in Commonwealth v.
McFerron, 680 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. 1984).
[Vol. 70:736
JURY DISCRIMINATION
nation by relying solely on the facts concerning the selection
of the jury in his or her case.20
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Equal Protection of the Laws
Courts have struggled to eliminate racial discrimination in
jury selection procedures since 1875 when Congress made it a
crime to "exclude or fail to summon a qualified citizen for
jury service on the basis of race. ' 21 The case of Strauder v.
West Virginia 22 was the first in a long line of decisions23 estab-
lishing that exclusion of blacks from jury service is a denial of
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.24 As stated in Strauder:
The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine .... [H]ow can it be maintained
that compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life
by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has ex-
pressly excluded every man of his race, because of color
alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a de-
nial to him of equal legal protection?
25
20. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1948).
22. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the Supreme Court struck down a statute
excluding blacks from jury service as a violation of the equal protection clause. The
Court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury composed of his peers. It further de-
clared that denying black people the opportunity to participate on juries branded them
as inferior and stimulated prejudice. Id. at 308.
The same year, the Supreme Court applied these rules in the selection of grand
juries. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). The following year, the Court extended
the principles announced in Strauder to racially discriminatory use of facially neutral
jury selection laws. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
23. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977); Carter v. Jury Comm'n 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545 (1967); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85
(1955); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559
(1953); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463
(1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Ken-
tucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Carter v. Texas,
177 U.S. 442 (1900); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
24. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
25. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308-09.
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The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
does not require a jury to contain representatives of the de-
fendant's racial, religious or political group.26 It does, how-
ever, require that prospective jurors be selected by non-
discriminatory criteria.2 7 The desired result is juror selection
on the basis of individual qualifications rather than group
characteristics.28 To exclude an eligible class of the commu-
nity undermines the protection a jury trial is intended to
secure.
29
The equal protection clause prevents a prosecutor from
challenging potential jurors solely because of their race,3° or
on the assumption that black jurors as a group will necessarily
be partial to a black defendant. 31 As a result, every person
whose life, liberty, or property is at issue is guaranteed that he
26. Id. at 305. It is interesting to note the sharp distinction the Supreme Court
makes between venire selection and the composition of individual juries. In general, the
cases involving selection of venires stress that the exclusion of minorities inhibits impar-
tiality and public confidence in the jury system. It seems that this reasoning would lead
the Court to require minority representation on the petit jury as well. Yet, the Court
has consistently maintained that all the Constitution prohibits is the systematic exclu-
sion of particular groups from jury panels. There are three factors responsible for the
Court's reluctance to extend the cross section requirement to petit juries. First, there
are problems in attaining statistically representative panels. See Comment, Limiting the
Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715,
1732 (1977). Second, a representative jury might include those who could theoretically
be challenged for cause. Id. at 1733. Finally, requiring a true cross section of the com-
munity to serve on the final jury panel would limit the scope of the peremptory chal-
lenge. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
27. Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345
(1880).
28. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946).
29. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. In a more recent decision, Justice Marshall ex-
plained the harm in purposefully excluding a group of the community:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury
service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps un-
workable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently
vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury
of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any
case that may be presented.
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).
30. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1717. See also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482
(1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403
(1945); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 305 (1880).
31. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1717. See also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599
(1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881).
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or she will not be put on trial before a jury from which mem-
bers of his or her race have been purposely excluded.32
B. The Peremptory Challenge
The peremptory challenge provides both the prosecutor
and the public defender with a method of eliminating
veniremembers whose statements do not justify a challenge for
cause. 33 They are often exercised upon sudden impressions,
stereotypes and affiliations that indicate a particular juror
might be biased in favor of the opposition.34 Courts do not
require an explanation for these perceptions, nor do they re-
view their validity.35 Instead, parties are allowed to rely on
their instincts. The system's goal is to eliminate extremes of
partiality in order to produce a body of jurors who will be able
to view the evidence objectively.36 While the peremptory
challenge is widely recognized as a necessary tool in securing
an impartial jury, it has never been given constitutional
status.37
32. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1718. The Court pointed out that while many of their
decisions have concerned discrimination during selection of the venire, the principles
announced also forbid discrimination on account of race in selection of the petit jury.
The fourteenth amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings bringing
him to justice. Id. See Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942).
33. A challenge for cause is made on a "narrowly specified, provable and legally
cognizable basis of partiality." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). These
challenges may be exercised only when an actual or implied bias exists. Actual bias is a
state of mind that will prevent the juror from acting impartially. Implied bias is a bias
presumed by the law on the basis of a relationship between the prospective juror and
some aspect of the case.
34. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 403 (1894); Hayes v. Missouri, 120
U.S. 68 (1887). Peremptory challenges allow parties to excuse a certain number of ju-
rors even though it is difficult to express any legal objection to them. It is often exer-
cised upon the "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another." Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1892).
35. The Supreme Court has often acknowledged the importance of the peremptory
challenge, but its views on the exercise of the challenge have been contradictory. Coin-
pare Sawyer v. United States, 202 U.S. 150, 165 (1906) (holding that the exercise of
peremptory challenges are subject to the court's review) with Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (holding that the exercise of peremptory challenges are beyond the
court's control).
36. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
37. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919); Pointer, 151 U.S. at 408;
Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376.
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C. Striking a Balance
The equal protection principles announced in Strauder
have never been questioned. In relation to the peremptory
challenge, however, their application presents a unique prob-
lem. The conflict stems from two competing interests.38 The
peremptory challenge, which is protected from scrutiny, al-
lows the prosecution to excuse prospective jurors for any rea-
son, including race, religion, nationality and occupation. 39 At
the same time, a defendant has the right to be tried by a jury
from which his peers have not been excluded solely on the
basis of race.40
The landmark case of Swain v. Alabama4 1 attempted to
balance these considerations by ruling that a prosecutor's re-
moval of blacks from a particular jury is insulated from con-
stitutional review based on the assumption that the challenges
are exercised for acceptable trial-related reasons.42 The ra-
tionale for this determination was that the peremptory chal-
38. See Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on
the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157 (1967).
Analysis must start with the basic reality that, where racial identification is con-
cerned, the rationale of the peremptory challenge is at war with the ideal of non-
discriminatory selection of jurors. The latter is intended to produce juries that
are fair and are recognized as such by the public. It rests on the premise that to
accomplish this purpose the jury must reasonably reflect the community's heter-
ogeneous elements, or at least not exclude any of the community's components.
The peremptory challenge system, on the other hand, is intended to allow each
party to exclude members of groups which may be unfriendly to his own cause
or predisposed towards his opponents. It permits the lawyer to eliminate hetero-
geneity in pursuit of the friendliest, i.e. most partial, jury. Since both sides are
permitted to play this game, their efforts in some circumstances may cancel each
other and produce a reasonably heterogeneous set ofjurors whose counteracting
biases produce overall impartiality, or may eliminate extremes of partiality and
produce a more nearly neutral body of jurors.
Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAl. L. REv. 235, 287 (1968).
39. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
41. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Swain, a black defendant who had been convicted of
rape by an all-white jury, presented two arguments alleging improper use of the peremp-
tory challenge by the prosecutor. First, the defendant contended that there had been a
violation of the fourteenth amendment when the prosecutor struck all six blacks on the
venire. Second, the defendant argued that the prosecutor's systematic use of the per-
emptory challenge against blacks over a long period of time constituted discrimination
and the rationale behind the peremptory challenge system was insufficient justification.
Id. at 205-11.
42. Id. at 223. Swain stated that the "presumption is not overcome and the prose-
cutor therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Ne-
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lenge is an absolute right "frequently exercised on grounds
normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings .... 43
Thus, people of all races, religions and occupations are subject
to being challenged.44 The Court reasoned that subjecting the
prosecutor's motives regarding the peremptory challenge to
limitations would radically alter the nature and usefulness of
the procedure.
Although striking blacks in any particular case was held to
be permissible,46 Swain indicated that a prosecutor's use of the
peremptory challenge over a period of time to systematically
exclude all blacks from jury service might constitute a denial
of equal protection of the laws.47 The Court explained:
When the prosecutor in a county, in case after case,
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and who-
ever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for
the removal of Negroes ... it would appear that the pur-
poses of the peremptory challenge are being perverted. If
the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury
in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecu-
tor may well be overcome.48
groes were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were
Negroes." Id. at 222.
43. Id. at 220.
44. The Court noted that "[i]n the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro
and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without
cause." Id. at 221. This position is in accord with numerous decisions in lower federal
and state courts. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 853 (1948); People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N.W.2d 466
(1943), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 749 (1944).
45. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22.
46. Both the majority and the dissenters agreed that the exclusion of blacks from a
particular case was permissible. Their views differed, however, regarding the prosecu-
tor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges over a period of time. Justice
Goldberg stated that the fact that no black person had ever served on a petit jury in
Talladega County constituted a prima facie case of discrimination which shifted the
burden of proof to the State. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 238 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg's "rule of exclusion" does not provide an adequate
solution since a prosecutor could easily evade the rule by leaving a token number of
blacks on the jury panel in an unimportant case.
47. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. The evidence offered by the defendant in Swain did not
meet that standard. While the defendant showed that the prosecutors in the jurisdiction
had exercised their strikes to exclude blacks from the jury, he offered no proof of the
circumstances under which prosecutors were responsible for striking black jurors be-
yond the facts of his own case. Id. at 224-28.
48. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama4 9 has
been criticized as being both impractical50 and theoretically
unsound.5 ' One major objection centered on the numerous re-
quirements a defendant must meet in order to carry the bur-
den of proof:
To make out a case of discrimination where juries are chosen
by the strike system, then, the individual defendant is re-
quired to make some kind of showing with respect to the
prosecutor's conduct and the motives behind it, in earlier tri-
als extending over an indefinite period of time, trials in
which he was not involved and regarding which his opportu-
nities for gathering evidence are severely restricted.52
To require affirmative proof of how often and under what
circumstances the prosecutor has removed blacks in past cases
imposes an impossible burden on the defendant. Not being a
party to the previous actons, the defendant is forced to rely on
the faded recollection of others or on incomplete court
records.53 Consequently, only one defendant alleging system-
49. The systematic exclusion standard announced in Swain presented a formidable
hurdle for a variety of reasons.
First, Swain declared that the mere absence of blacks on juries over an extended
period of time does not establish systematic exclusion if the defendant cannot
show that the state was solely responsible for that result. Second, the Court
announced a rebuttable presumption that the prosecutor used the government's
peremptory challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury in any given case. Fi-
nally, the Court never fully delineated the elements of a pattern of systematic
exclusion.
Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite
Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554, 560 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
50. Lower courts have noted the practical difficulties of proving that the State sys-
tematically exercised the peremptory challenge to exclude blacks from the jury because
of their race. See, e.g., United States v. Person, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971);
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
51. See, e.g., Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322, 325 (1965);
Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving A Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
247, 268-70 (1973); Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle
Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662 (1974); Note, Re-
thinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (1985).
52. Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of
the All- White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1161 (1966).
53. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 302
(1968). Inadequate records pose a virtually insurmountable problem for the defendant.
Even if the time and money needed for a proper investigation were there, the data gen-
erally is not. Records are rarely kept of which jurors were challenged or the race of
those excused.
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atic exclusion of blacks had met the high evidentiary stan-
dards proposed in Swain by the time of the Batson decision.54
III. THE BATSON OPINIONS
A. The Majority
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, began by rejecting
the evidentiary formula outlined in Swain v. Alabama.55 The
Court then outlined a three-step prima facie test which would
enable a defendant to establish a presumption of purposeful
discrimination relying solely on the facts in the case. 56 In or-
der to raise the presumption, the defendant must begin by
showing membership in a cognizable racial group. 7 Second,
the defendant must prove that the prosecutor exercised per-
emptory challenges to remove members of the defendant's
race from the venire. s Third, from all the circumstances of
the case, the defendant must show a strong likelihood that
such persons were challenged solely on the basis of race.59
The Court suggested that a defendant might make such a
showing by demonstrating a "pattern" of strikes against black
jurors or by using the prosecutor's questions and statements
during voir dire.
54. See State v. Brown, 371 So.2d 751, 752 (La. 1979). Defendants have failed to
meet their burden of proof for a variety of reasons. Some have failed to establish the
role of the state, as opposed to that of the defense, in peremptorily challenging blacks.
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Some defendants have not shown that the
percentage of black veniremen peremptorily challenged was sufficiently high to consti-
tute a systematic exclusion of blacks. See United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976). Other defendants have failed to allege a
sufficient quantity of cases in which blacks had been peremptorily challenged by the
prosecution. Finally, some defendants have failed to show that blacks had been pe-
remptorily challenged regardless of the circumstances.
55. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
56. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723 (1986). The Court relied on stan-
dards that have been "fully articulated" since the Swain decision to formulate the new
evidentiary standard. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625. 629-31
(1972).
57. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Race, ancestry, and national origin are considered
to be cognizable groups. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954). Sex is a
cognizable group also. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
58. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
59. Id. This does not mean that members of the defendant's race are immune from
peremptory challenges. Individual members may still be struck on grounds of specific
bias or reasons other than race.
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Once a prima facie showing is made and the presumption
arises, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a neutral
explanation for the challenges. While the prosecutor is re-
quired to give a "clear and reasonably specific" 60 explanation
of his actions, the Court stressed that the response "need not
rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. "61
If the prosecutor fails to respond, the defendant will have es-
tablished purposeful discrimination. If the prosecutor offers
some explanation, then the trial court has the responsibility of
determining whether the defendant has established the dis-
criminatory use of premptory challenges. 62 As concerns the
Batson case in particular, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the trial court for application of the three-pronged test
stating: "If the trial court decides that the facts establish,
prima facie, purposeful discrimination, and the prosecutor
does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his ac-
tion, our precedents require that petitioner's conviction be
reversed." 63
B. The Concurrences
While agreeing with the result, five Justices filed concur-
ring opinions to emphasize different aspects of the case. Jus-
tice White agreed that an opportunity to question the
prosecutor's motives should be afforded when members of the
defendant's race are peremptorily challenged. 64 However, he
60. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Requiring an explanation for a peremptory chal-
lenge is a significant departure from its traditionally arbitrary character. The Court
noted that the prosecutor may not rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination by
stating that the juror might be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.
Nor may the prosecutor simply deny that the challenges were made without a discrimi-
natory motive. Id.
61. Id.
62. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1724. The State argued that the holding would gradually
erode the usefulness of the peremptory challenge. Not only did the Court state that the
modification would "further the ends of justice," they cited lower courts who have not
found the procedure burdensome. Id. at 1724 n.23.
63. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1725. The retroactivity of the holding drew criticism from
both the concurring Justices and the dissenters. See infra notes 65, 70, 75.
64. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1725 (1986) (White, J., concurring). Jus-
tice White, who authored the Swain decision, conceded that it had led to widespread
discrimination in the selection ofjuries and thus, a modification of the peremptory chal-
lenge was justified.
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did not feel that the decision should apply retroactively.65
Justice Marshall also concurred but thought the Court should
go one step further in fashioning a remedy.66 He asserted that
"[tihe inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial
grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely
"67
Justices Stevens and Brennan pointed out that Batson's ar-
gument was based on the constitutional provisions of the sixth
amendment rather than the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment relied upon by the Court.68  Because the equal
protection claim was asserted as a basis of affirmance by the
party defending the judgment, however, the Justices felt the
Court was wise in addressing it.69 Finally, Justice O'Connor
agreed with Justice White that the decision would not require
reversal of Batson's conviction.7 °
C. The Dissent
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, crit-
icizing the majority for addressing the equal protection issue
65. Id. Justice White pointed out that Batson's conviction need not be reversed just
as DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), did not require a retroactive applicatin of
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
66. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1712, 1727 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1728. Some commentators question whether the peremptory system is
really necessary anymore. Jury lists that represent a cross section of the community
and the ability to challenge a juror for cause may be enough to ensure the impartial jury
guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The jury system could survive without the per-
emptory challenge but it is unlikely that it will be banned.
First of all, there are surely those who would advocate the total abolition of the
peremptory challenge. This is, of course, by far the most unlikely. We have seen
... how the peremptory challenge serves a useful and needed function to both
sides of the controversy, civil or criminal. There may well be many times where
one's intuition or experience leads to the feeling that a given juror would not
fairly and impartially consider the evidence presented in court. Although this
intuitive objection would not sustain a challenge for cause, the peremptory chal-
lenge may be used quite satisfactorily at no risk to the attorney's case.
Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of
Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157, 164 (1967).
68. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1729 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
69. Id. Justices Stevens and Brennan believed that it was proper for the Court to
consider a problem that has been "percolating" in the courts for years. Review of an
issue not presented was one of the dissent's major objections. See infra note 71 and
accompanying text.
70. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1731 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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despite the petitioner's failure to present it: "In such circum-
stances, review of an equal protection argument is improper in
this Court."' 71 Even if Batson had based his claim on a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, the Chief Justice felt that
the standards applied under the equal protection clause were
not fully applicable to the peremptory challenge. 72 His ration-
ale was that peremptory challenges based on racial classifica-
tions do not "stigmatize" people in the way that racial
classifications per se stigmatize:
The [latter] singles out the excluded group, while individuals
of all groups are equally subject to peremptory challenge on
any basis, including their group affiliation. Further, venire-
pool exclusion bespeaks a priori across-the-board total unfit-
ness, while peremptory strike exclusion merely suggests po-
tential partiality in a particular isolated case.73
Chief Justice Burger pointed out that it would be difficult
to distinguish between a "reasonably specific" explanation of
"legitimate reasons" and a challenge for cause: "Apparently
the Court envisions permissible challenges short of a challenge
for cause that are just a little bit arbitrary - but not too
much."17 4 Without any guidelines, he feared that trial judges
71. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1731 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger pointed out that since the petitioner relied solely on a sixth amend-
ment claim, the Court could have directed the parties to brief the equal protection ques-
tion after granting certiorari. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 408 U.S. 921
(1972). Similarly, following oral argument, the Court could have directed reargument
on the issue. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (1982); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
345 U.S. 972 (1953). He urged the Court to use one of these accepted courses of action
before disregarding centuries of experience.
72. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1736. The Chief Justice objected to the Court's use of
general equal protection principles to support its holding:
[P]eremptory challenges are often lodged, of necessity, for reasons "normally
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, reli-
gion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty."
. . . Moreover, in making peremptory challenges, both the prosecutor and de-
fense attorney necessarily act on only limited information or hunch. The process
can not be indicted on the sole basis of "assumption" or "intuitive judgment."
•.. As a result, unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable to
peremptory challenges exercised in any particular case.
Id. at 1737 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 1736.
74. Id. at 1739.
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would be left with the difficult task of sorting through the im-
plications of the holding.7 5
Justice Rehnquist stated that the use of peremptory chal-
lenges would not violate the equal protection clause as long as
they were used against prospective jurors of all races:
In my view there is simply nothing "unequal" about the
State using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from
the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as such
challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving
white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic de-
fendants, and so on.76
Consequently, the dissenters concluded that a time-honored
procedure such as the peremptory challenge should not be
altered.
IV. CRITIQUE
By holding that racial discrimination may be established
using the facts surrounding the selection of a jury in a single
case, the Supreme Court attempted to give defendants a more
effective method of vindicating their constitutional rights.
The Court's reliance on "fully articulated" standards, how-
ever, prevented it from exploring and defining the practical
aspects of the new ruling.77 Unfortunately, without clearly es-
tablishing some guidelines, the protection might prove to be
illusory.
A. Correction of Swain's Theoretical Errors
Batson v. Kentucky78 represents a judicial commitment to
the view that all people, regardless of their race, must be al-
lowed to participate in the administration of justice.79 Im-
plicit in the holding is the recognition that racial
discrimination in the selection of juries is a violation of the
equal protection clause, and that all jury selection procedures
75. The Chief Justice joined Justice White in concluding that retroactive applica-
tion was not necessary in this case.
76. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1744 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. The standards were articulated in a series of decisions. See Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229. 241-42 (1976):
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629-31 (1972).
78. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
79. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
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are subject to fourteenth amendment commands. Swain v. Al-
abama enabled prosecutors to use peremptory challenges as a
tool of individious discrimination.8" By eliminating all jurors
of a particular race, prosecutors were able to escape the cross
sectional representation and produce a jury that was more bi-
ased than those coming from randomly selected venires.81
Consequently, the defendant's right to equal protection and a
trial by a fair and impartial jury was denied. By permitting
such discrimination within a single case, the Swain decision
sacrificed individual rights in order to spare the arbitrary
character of the peremptory challenge.82 In view of the im-
portance of the individual and community interests involved,
however, it is the peremptory challenge that should be sacri-
ficed, or at least modified.
As opposed to Swain, the Batson decision provides a more
workable standard to ensure the equal protection promise for
every defendant. If the goal is to uncover the truth behind the
prosecutor's exclusion of blacks, it seems reasonable to require
the prosecutor, who has access to the evidence and the wit-
nesses, to demonstrate that the challenge was not based solely
on race.83 Inevitably the state is in a better position to show
its motives were impartial than a defendant is to prove the
contrary. 84
The Supreme Court stressed that requiring the prosecutor
to give a neutral explanation would not undermine the tradi-
tional role of the peremptory challenge. 85 A prosecutor is still
80. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
81. Comment, Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges: Uncertainty in the
Criminal Law, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1983).
82. In a recent case Justice Brennan, who joined the majority in the 1965 Swain
decision, stated that the Court's equal protection analysis was wrong:
With the hindsight that two decades affords, it is apparent to me that Swain's
reasoning was misconceived. Stripped of its historical embellishments, Swain
holds that the state may presume in exercising peremptory challenges that only
white jurors will be sufficiently impartial to try a Negro defendant fairly. In
other words, Swain authorizes the presumption that a Negro juror will be partial
to a Negro defendant simply because both belong to the same race.
Thompson v. United States, 469 U.S. 1024, 1026 (1984).
83. Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of
the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966).
84. Id. at 1163.
85. There is a great deal of controversy surrounding this point. Many people be-
lieve that modification of the peremptory challenge will lead to its gradual erosion:
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allowed to exercise peremptory challenges for stereotypical or
intuitive reasons so long as they are not based on race alone.
Thus, the modification does not destroy the peremptory sys-
tem and the discriminatory use of the challenges is no longer
protected.
B. Practical Limitations
Although the basic premise of the Batson decision is admi-
rable in its effort to further constitutional rights,86 application
of the holding illustrates its weaknesses. The opinion alludes
to circumstances that might affect the trial court's determina-
tion of a prima facie showing. As noted earlier, "a 'pattern' of
strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire
might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly,
the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire ex-
amination and in exercising his challenges may support or re-
fute an inference of discriminatory purpose. ' 87 Knowing this,
a prosecutor could easily circumvent the ruling by asking a
series of questions which would lay the foundation necessary
to dismiss black jurors on non-racial grounds. Requiring a
prima facie showing of discrimination leaves the defendant
without a remedy in cases where the prosecutor's tactics are
less than flagrant.88 Thus, a prosecutor's motives would still
be protected from judicial review as long as his methods of
discrimination were subtle.8 9
If a prima facie case is established and the burden shifts to
the prosecutor to give a neutral explanation, trial courts face
the difficult task of assessing the prosecutor's motives. As one
Once we ban the use of race, we are inevitably led to ban the use of ethnicity and
religion, and almost as inevitably led to ban the use of gender. From there we
may progress to the view that the use of virtually any identifiable attribute an
individual may possess is illegal. Long before we reach this point, however, we
will have completely abolished the system of peremptory challenges as it exists
today and as it has existed in the past.
King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
86. Since peremptory challenges are granted by statute, they must yield to four-
teenth amendment rights. Yet, courts in the past have gone to great lengths to ensure
their unrestricted use. See supra note 2.
87. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
88. Id. at 1727.
89. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 195, 415 N.E.2d 805,
809-810 (1981).
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
court noted, "attorneys, confronted with a rule completely or
partially restricting their right to act with the internal motive
of helping their clients when making peremptory challenges,
will be under enormous pressure to lie regarding their mo-
tives."9 Such a rule will foster hypocrisy instead of further-
ing the ends of justice as the Court had hoped.9
The most difficult question arising from the Batson deci-
sion is the sufficiency of the prosecutor's neutral explanation.
Every prosecutor could develop a standard list of reasons for
striking jurors, such as the person was distracted or unrespon-
sive. It is unclear whether such general assertions would suf-
fice. If the peremptory challenge is to remain reasonably
peremptory, parties must be given a wide degree of discretion
in their exercise of the challenge.92 But if any seemingly neu-
tral explanation is enough to rebut the presumption of dis-
crimination, then the protection afforded under the Batson
decision is no more helpful to a defendant than the insur-
mountable burden of proof proposed in Swain.93
The tragedy of the Batson decision is that the Court offers
no guidance in resolving these practical considerations. As
the dissent stated, the decision "leaves roughly 7,000 general
jurisdiction state trial judges and approximately 500 federal
trial judges at large to find their way through the morass the
Court creates . . . . " A discussion of the practical aspects
would have made the Court's holding more effective. Never-
theless, the decision represents a step in the right direction.
Because of the Batson case, and in particular its constitutional
presumption of invidious discrimination, prosecutors will be
hesitant to exclude all black veniremembers.9 5
90. King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. One commentator thinks the Batson decision comes too late: "Relaxing
Swain's difficult burden of proof and regulating the peremptory challenge attacks the
problem of unrepresentative juries after the seeds of prejudice sown in the preliminary
stages of the jury selection process have grown to maturity and borne fruit." Comment,
The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Pereinptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A
Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN.
L. REV. 554, 570 (1977).
94. Balson, 106 S. Ct. at 1741.
95. Although the Batson decision only addressed racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion procedures, the holding may be extended to include discriminatory acts based on
sex and national origin. See Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Can the "New' Peremptory Chal-
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V. CONCLUSION
The virtually unchecked exercise of peremptory challenges
on the basis of race has tended to make equal protection of the
laws a hollow promise. At the same time, the peremptory
challenge plays a major role in securing an impartial jury.
Thus, there must be a compromise between the two interests.
The Supreme Court has suggested a solution which pro-
tects constitutional rights without completely destroying the
peremptory challenge system. Defendants now have a more
effective method of challenging discrimination in the selection
of their petit juries. Since Batson v. Kentucky changes the na-
ture of the peremptory challenge, however, the decision is
likely to receive criticism from those believing in the necessity
of the challenge's arbitrary character. The Court was correct
in stating that "[m]uch litigation will be required to spell out
the contours of the Court's equal protection holding ...."
Only time will tell if the decision has struck the proper bal-
ance between the peremptory challenge and the promise of
equal protection to all in securing a fair and impartial jury.97
CAROLYN A. YAGLA
lenge Survive the Resurrection of Strauder v. West Virginia?, 20 AKRON L. REV. 355,
361 (1986).
96. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1725 (1986) (White, J., concurring).
97. In Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986), the Supreme Court concluded that
the Batson holding should not be given retroactive effect on collateral review of convic-
tions that became final before Batson was decided. In Brown v. United States, 106 S.
Ct. 2275 (1986), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Batson
holding should be applied retroactively in cases pending on direct appeal. See also Grif-
fith v. Kentucky, 106. S. Ct. 2274 (1986).
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